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The collection and storage of fingerprint profiles and 
DNA samples in the field of forensic science for non-
violent crimes is highly controversial. While biometric 
techniques such as fingerprinting have been used in law 
enforcement since the early 1900s, DNA presents a more 
invasive and contentious technique as most sampling is of 
an intimate nature (e.g. buccal swab). A fingerprint is a 
pattern residing on the surface of the skin while a DNA 
sample needs to be extracted in the vast majority of cases 
(e.g. at times extraction even implying the breaking of the 
skin). This paper aims to balance the need to collect DNA 
samples where direct evidence is lacking in violent 
crimes, versus the systematic collection of DNA from 
citizens who have committed acts such as petty crimes. 
The legal, ethical and social issues surrounding the 
proliferation of DNA collection and storage are explored, 
with a view to outlining the threats that such a regime 
may pose to citizens in the not-to-distant future, especially 




The aim of this paper is to apply the science, 
technology and society (STS) studies approach which 
combines history, social study and philosophy of science 
to the legal history of DNA sampling and profiling in the 
United Kingdom since the first forensic use of DNA in a 
criminal court case in 1988. The paper begins by defining 
the application of biometrics to the field of criminal law, 
in particular the use of fingerprint and DNA identification 
techniques. It then presents the differences between 
fingerprints and DNA evidence and focuses on 
distinguishing between DNA profiles and samples, and 
DNA databanks and databases. Finally the paper presents 
the legal, ethical and social concerns of the proliferation 
of DNA collection and storage in particular jurisdictions 
prior to 2010 (e.g. United Kingdom). The paper points to 
the pressing need for the review of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and to the procedures for 
DNA collection and storage in the U.K.’s National DNA 
Database (NDNAD) which was established in 1995. 
Some examples are provided of the state of play in the 
United States as well. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
It is of no surprise that in recent years there has been 
a convergence between science and technology studies 
(STS)  and law and society (L&S)  studies. Some 
commentators, like this author believe that there is a need 
to define a new theoretical framework that amalgamates 
these increasingly converging areas. Lynch et al. [6, p.14] 
write: “[w]hen law turns to science or science turns to law, 
we have the opportunity to examine how these two 
powerful systems work out their differences.” This 
convergence has its roots planted in legal disputes in the 
fields of health, safety and environmental regulation. For 
instance, advances in technology have challenged ones 
right to live or die.  New innovations have the capacity to 
draw out traditional distinctions of regulations or they can 
challenge and even evade them.  
In this paper we study the “DNA controversy” using 
the conceptual framework that can be found in Figure 1 
which depicts the role of major stakeholders in the debate. 
In the early 1990s the “DNA Wars” [6] focused on two 
major problems with respect to the techno-legal 
accountability of DNA evidence in a court of law. The 
first had to do with the potential for error in the forensic 
laboratory, and the second had to do with the combination 
of genetic and statistical datasets. And it did not just have 
to do with legal and administrative matters, but issues that 
were both technical and scientific in nature. The key 
players included expert lawyers, scientists who actively 
participated in legal challenges and public policy debates, 
and the media who investigated and reported the 
controversy [6]. To put an end to the controversy would 
require the coming together of law, science and the public 
in a head-on confrontation.  And that is indeed what 
occurred. By the late 1990s DNA had become an 
acceptable method of suspect identification and a great 
number of onlookers prematurely rushed to declare a 
closure to the controversy although as commentators have 
stated there was no moment of truth or definitive 
judgment that put an end to the controversy. What many 
did not recognize at the time however, is that the DNA 
controversy would return, in places like the United 





















Figure 1. The Core Set Diagram: Studying the DNA 
Controversy 
 
It is with great interest to read that closure in the 
DNA controversy was really visible when the NDNAD 
and some of the legislation and policy surrounding it 
facilitated talks between nations in Europe with respect to 
harmonization. According to Lynch et al. [6, p.229]: 
“[e]fforts were made to “harmonize” DNA 
profile and database standards in Europe, and 
other international efforts were made to 
coordinate forensic methods in order to track 
suspected “mobile” criminals and terrorists 
across national borders. These international 
efforts to implement and standardize DNA 
profiling contributed to closure in particular 
localities by demonstrating that the technique 
was widely used and had become a fixture of 
many criminal justice systems.” 
 
While closure it may have signified to those working 
within an STS and L&S approach, harmonization was 
certainly not reached. Far from it, the U.K. who had been 
responsible for initial harmonization efforts, later, lost its 
way. What made onlookers believe that closure had fully 
occurred were the technical, legal and administrative fixes 
that had taken place. But closure in this instance did not 
mean the complete end to the controversy- no- what was 
coming was much greater disquiet in the U.K, and this 
period was named ‘post-closure’ by the STS and L&S 
commentators. Postclosure signals a period of time after 
closure is established, when the possibilities for issues 
that were once closed are reopened. In the case of the 
NDNAD in the U.K. it was not old issues that were 
reopened during postclosure, but new issues that were 
introduced due to so-called legal fixes. These legal fixes 
had social implications, so it was not until the public and 
the media and non-government organizations alongside 
self-interest groups were satisfied that change would be 
imminent, that postclosure seemed a real possibility. The 
threat to the post-closure of the DNA controversy 
however, is the burgeoning demand for DNA samples in 
fields such as epidemiology research and the recent 
commercialization of DNA sample collection and storage 
for every day citizens (e.g. DNA home kits selling for less 
than $100US dollars). DNA is no longer seen as just 
useful for forensic science or health, and this is placing 
incredible pressure on the advanced identification 
technique which is increasingly becoming commoditized. 
 
3. Background: What is Biometrics? 
 
As defined by the Association for Biometrics (AFB) 
a biometric is “...a measurable, unique physical 
characteristic or personal trait to recognize the identity, or 
verify the claimed identity, of an enrollee.” The physical 
characteristics that can be used for identification include: 
facial features, full face and profile, fingerprints, 
palmprints, footprints, hand geometry, ear (pinna) shape, 
retinal blood vessels, striation of the iris, surface blood 
vessels (e.g., in the wrist), and electrocardiac waveforms 
[1]. Other examples of biometric types include DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid), odor, skin reflectance, 
thermogram, gait, keystroke, and lip motion. Biometrics 
have seven characteristics: they are universal in that every 
person should possess that given characteristic; they are 
unique in that no two persons should have the same 
pattern; they are permanent in that they do not change 
over time; they are collectable and quantifiable; there is 
performance in that the measure is accurate, it is 
acceptable to users; and circumventing, meaning that the 
system of identification theoretically cannot be duped [2]. 
The two most popular methods of identification today in 
criminal law, when direct evidence is lacking such as a 
first hand eyewitness account, are fingerprinting and 
DNA. 
 
4. What is Fingerprinting? 
 
Fingerprints are classified upon a number of 
fingerprint characteristics or unique pattern types, which 
include arches, loops and whorls [3, p.228]. If one 
inspects the epidermis layer of the fingertips closely, one 
can see that it is made up of ridge and valley structures 
forming a unique geometric pattern. The ridge endings are 
given a special name called minutiae. Identifying an 
individual using the relative position of minutiae and the 
number of ridges between minutiae is the traditional 
algorithm used to compare pattern matches. As 
 








fingerprints do not change from birth until death unless 
they are accidentally or deliberately deformed, it is argued 
that they can provide an absolute proof of identity. The 
science of fingerprint identification is called dactyloscopy 
[4, p.4]. 
 
4.1. Fingerprinting as Applied to Criminal Law 
 
Fingerprints left behind at the scene of a crime (SOC) 
can be used to collect physical evidence for the purposes 
of human identification. They have the capacity to link a 
person (e.g. a suspect) to a particular location at a given 
time. This can happen in one of two ways: (i) the 
suspect’s fingerprints are taken and cross-matched with 
those fingerprints found at the scene of a crime; or (ii) a 
successful match is found using computer technology to 
compare the fingerprints found at the scene of a crime 
with a database of previous offenders. It should be noted 
that fingerprinting in criminal law is not new. Manual 
standards, for instance, existed since the 1920s when the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. started 
processing fingerprint cards. These standards ensured 
completeness, quality and permanency.  
By the early 1970s due to progress in computer 
processing power and storage, and the rise of new more 
sophisticated software applications, law enforcement 
began to use automatic machines to classify, store, and 
retrieve fingerprint data. The FBI led the way by 
introducing the Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification Systems (IAFIS) that could scan a 
fingerprint image and convert the minutiae to digital 
information and compare it to thousands of other 
fingerprints [5, p.411]. Today, very large computer 
databases containing millions of fingerprints of persons 
who have been arrested are used to make comparisons 
with prints obtained from new crime scenes. These 
comparisons can literally take seconds or minutes 
depending on the depth of the search required. Sometimes 
successful matches can be made, other times the 
fingerprints cannot be matched. When fingerprints cannot 
be matched it is inferred that a new offender has 
committed a crime. These ‘new’ prints are still stored on 
the database as a means to trace back crimes committed 
by a person committing a second offence and who is 
apprehended by direct evidence, thus creating a trail of 
criminal events linked back to the same individual with 
the potential to solve multiple crimes. Commonly a list of 
prints that come closest to matching that print found at the 
scene of a crime are returned for further examination by 
an expert who then deems which single print is the closest 
match. In recent years background checks are even 
conducted on individuals using fingerprints, as a means to 
gain employment such as in early childhood [4, p.5], or 
during the process of adoption or other security clearance 
requirements. 
 
5. What is DNA? 
 
DNA fingerprinting, DNA (geno)typing, DNA profiling, 
identity testing and identification analysis, all denote the 
ability to characterize one or more rare features of an 
individual’s genome, that is, their hereditary makeup. 
DNA contains the blueprints that are responsible for our 
cells, tissues, organs, and body [4, p.8]. In short it can be 
likened to “God’s signature” [6, p.259]. Every single 
human has a unique composition, save for identical twins 
who share the same genotype but have subtly different 
phenotypes. When DNA samples are taken from blood 
cells, saliva or hair bulb specimens of the same person, 
the structure of the DNA remains the same. Thus only one 
sample is required as the basis for DNA profiling, and it 
can come from any tissue of the body [7, p.1]. DNA 
fingerprinting was discovered in 1985 by English 
geneticist Dr Alec Jeffreys. He found that certain regions 
of DNA contained sequences that repeated themselves 
over and over again, one after the other and that different 
individuals had a different number of repeated sections. 
He developed a technique to examine the length variation 
of these DNA repeat sequences, thus creating the ability 
to perform identification tests [8, pp.2f].  
The smallest building block of DNA is known as the 
nucleotide. Each nucleotide contains a deoxyribose, a 
phosphate group and a base. When we are analyzing DNA 
structures it is the sequence of bases that is important for 
the purposes of identification [9, p.11]. There are four 
bases through which a genetic code is described. These 
are: Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Guanine (G) and 
Cytosine (C). When trying to understand DNA sequences 
as they might appear in written form, consider that ‘A’ 
only binds with ‘T’, and ‘G’ only binds with ‘C’ (see 
figure 2 comparing row one and two). These base pairs 
are repeated millions of times in every cell and it is their 
order of sequence that determines the characteristics of 
each person. It is repetitive DNA sequences that are 









Figure 2. A Typical DNA Sequence 
 
For example, in Figure 2 the base sequences of the 
two strands, known as the double helix, is written for a 
fictitious DNA sample. While the labels “5” and “3” have 
been included for illustrative purposes a sequence is 
written plainly as CTTAGCCATAGCCTA. From this 
sequence we can deduce the second strand given the rules 
for binding described above. Furthermore, in specific 
applications of DNA testing various polymorphisms may 
be considered which denote the type of repeat for a given 
stretch of DNA. For instance the tetranucleotide repeat is 
merely a stretch of DNA where a specific four nucleotide 
motif is repeated [9, p.10].   
 
5.1. DNA as Applied to Criminal Law 
 
DNA profiling can be applied to a broad range of 
applications including diagnostic medicine, family 
relationship analysis (proof of paternity and inheritance 
cases), and animal and plant sciences [7, p.31]. The most 
high profile use of DNA however is in the area of forensic 
science, popularized by modern day television series such 
as CSI Miami and Cold Case. Episodes from the series, 
such as “Death Pool” [11] and “Dead Air,” [12] allow 
members of the public to visualize how DNA might be 
used to gather evidence towards prosecution in a court of 
law. Although Hollywood is well known for its farcical 
and inaccurate representations, these episodes still do 
demonstrate the potential for DNA. DNA profiling 
illustrates the power to eliminate a suspect with a 
discrimination power so high that it can be considered a 
major identification mechanism [13, p.1]. It is with no 
doubt that forensic DNA analysis has made a huge impact 
on criminal justice and the law since its inception in U.K. 
Courts with the 1988 investigation into the deaths of 
schoolgirls Lynda Mann in 1983 and Dawn Ashworth in 
1986 [14]. Since that time, DNA has been used 
successfully in criminal law to help prove guilt or 
innocence [15], in family law to prove parentage, and in 
immigration law to prove blood relations for cases related 
to citizenship [4, p.xiii]. 
In forensic DNA analysis today, mitochondrial DNA 
is used for identification, as nuclear DNA does not 
possess the right properties toward individual 
identification [9, p.5]. According to Koblinsky et al. it is 
the moderately repetitious DNA that is of interest to 
forensic analysts [4, pp.17f]:  
“It has been shown that 99.9% of human DNA is 
the same in every individual. In fact, every 
individual’s DNA has a relatively small number of 
variations from others. It is that variation of 1 in 
every 1000 bases that allows us to distinguish one 
individual from another through forensic genetic 
testing.” 
Similarly in the case of dactyloscopy, an individual’s 
DNA can be left behind at a scene of a crime or on a 
victim. When natural fibers are transferred through human 
contact, for example, from a perpetrator to a victim, or 
natural fibers sometimes microscopic in nature are left 
behind at a scene of a crime, they can be used for 
evidentiary purposes. The DNA found in hair for example, 
can be compared to hair specimens taken from a crime 
suspect or the DNA profile stored in an existing DNA 
databank. Synthetic fibers not containing DNA, such as 
threads from a piece of clothing worn by a perpetrator, 
can also be used to link a suspect to a crime. When fibers 
are transferred from one person to another upon physical 
contact it is known as the Locard exchange principle [4, 
p.3].  
It is important to note that all physical evidence like 
DNA should only ever be considered circumstantial 
evidence. It is evidence that provides only a basis for 
inference about the claim being made, and can be used in 
logical reasoning to prove or disprove an assertion. In a 
criminal case, DNA alone cannot be used to prove 
someone’s guilt or innocence. Rather DNA may be able 
to point investigators to ‘what happened’, ‘the order of 
events that took place’, ‘who was involved’, ‘where an 
event took place’ and ‘how it might have taken place,’ 
and in that manner the forensic scientist is conducting a 
reconstruction by means of association (table 1) [16, p.1]. 
Thus the job of an investigator is to put all the pieces of 
the puzzle together and to gather as much information as 
possible and from as many available sources of evidence 
including eyewitness accounts, physical evidence and 
archival records [4, p.1].  
 
Table 1. A Theoretical Framework for the Discipline of 
Criminalistics [16, p.2] 
 
1. Divisible matter: the division of matter  
2. Transfer: the exchange of material between two objects 
3. Identification: the physico-chemical nature of evidence 
4. Individualization: determine the source of the evidence 
5. Association: linking a person with a crime scene 









As more sophisticated techniques have emerged to 
analyze DNA samples taken at the scene of a crime, the 
lesser the mass of DNA that is needed for a correct 
reading. How much DNA do you need? Well, it all 
depends on the richness of the sample. For instance, a 
2002 US State Police handbook noted that a clump of 
pulled hair contained enough material for successful 
RFLP (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism) 
typing. A single hair root provided enough nuclear DNA 
for PCR STR (polymerase chain reaction short tandem 
repeat) typing, but not enough for RFLP. And a hair shaft 
contained sufficient mitochondria for successful mtDNA 
(mitochondrial DNA) typing, but was inadequate for PCR 
STR or RFLP typing [16, p.61]. A blood, saliva, urine, 
bone, teeth, skin or semen sample could be considered a 
richer sample than a hair root for extraction purposes, but 
DNA analysis is all very much dependent on the level of 
degradation the sample has been exposed to.  
Environmental factors can be harmful to DNA that has 
been collected from a scene of a crime and can lead to 
issues relating to deterioration, destruction, or 
contamination of evidence which are all contestable 
issues a lawyer may have to deal with in a court of law [4, 
p.xiii]. For instance, heat, moisture, bacteria, ultraviolet 
(UV) rays and common chemicals can contribute to the 
degradation process [9, p.61]. When a sample undergoes 
some level of degradation, it is said to have had infringed 
upon the chain of custody. To get around such problems, 
experts have proposed bringing the laboratory closer to 
policing practice. The concept of “lab in a van” or “lab on 
a chip” (LOC) proposes the use of a mobile laboratory 
where analysis and interpretation of evidence is even 
possible at the scene of a crime [6, p.153]. The 
advancements in mobile technologies continue to allow 
for even very tiny biological substances to undergo DNA 
testing resulting in accurate identification. Even a 
cigarette butt which has saliva on it containing epithelial 
cells can be screened for DNA evidence [4, p.6].  
 
6. Comparing DNA and Fingerprinting 
 
To begin with, traditional fingerprinting classification 
techniques have been around a lot longer than DNA 
identification, although both fingerprinting and DNA 
have been part of the human body since the start of time. 
In its manual form, the Galton-Henry system of 
fingerprint classification first made its impact on the 
practices of Scotland Yard in 1901. So whereas 
fingerprint recognition can happen using manual methods, 
DNA testing can only happen using laboratory systems, 
even if analysis now takes the form of a mobile lab on a 
chip. DNA is also a pervasive and invasive biometric 
technique. That is DNA is owned by everyone, and DNA 
actually belongs to the internals of what makes up the 
body. For a DNA reading, a hair shaft has been detached 
from the scalp, teeth and skin and bones have to be 
‘dismembered’ from the body, blood and urine and saliva 
is extracted from the body [17, p.374]. 
In most states, the police can take non-intimate 
samples if a person has been arrested for a serious 
recordable offence, and in other states DNA can be taken 
for offences such as begging, being drunk and disorderly, 
and taking part in an illegal demonstration. In the U.K. for 
instance, DNA does not have to be directly relevant to 
investigating the offence for which a person is being 
arrested and they do not have to be charged before the 
sample is taken. The police are not allowed to take more 
than one successful sample from the same body part 
during the course of an investigation. The police can take 
an intimate sample only with a person's written consent 
even if they have been arrested. However, there is a 
burgeoning debate at present about what actually 
constitutes consent during such a process- is it true 
consent, or merely compliance or acknowledgment of 
required police procedures by the individual under arrest. 
Fingerprints are different in that while belonging to 
the body, they are a feature on the surface of the body, 
and they do not constitute mass. Fingerprints are patterns 
that appear on the skin, but they are not the fiber we know 
as skin. Fingerprints also exclude a small portion of the 
population- those who do not have particular fingers, or 
hands, or arms, or may have fingers that have been 
severely deformed due to accidental or deliberate damage. 
Despite these differences, the claim is made by scientists 
that forensic DNA testing has emerged as an accurate 
measure of someone’s identification with reliability equal 
to that of fingerprint recognition [4, p.5].  
 
6.1. Intimate and Non-Intimate Measures: Other 
Biometrics versus DNA Sampling 
 
6.1.1. The United States and Other Biometrics. The 
notion of “intimacy” is very much linked to literature on 
DNA, and not of biometrics in general. Although 
historically there has been some contention that a 
fingerprint sample is both “intimate” and “private”, the 
proliferation of fingerprint, handprint, and facial 
recognition systems now used for government and 
commercial applications, has rendered this debate 
somewhat redundant. This is not to say that the storage of 
personal attributes is not without its own commensurate 
risks but large-scale applications enforced by such acts as 
the United States Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act of 2002 mean that fingerprint, hand and 
facial recognition systems have now become 
commonplace. In fact, this trend promises to continue 
through multimodal biometrics, the adoption of several 
biometrics toward individual authentication. Few travelers, 
at the time of transit, directly challenge the right of 
authorities to be taking such personal details, and to be 
storing them on large databases in the name of national 
security. However sentiment, at least in North America, 
was different prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks 
on the Twin Towers [18].   
In 1997 biometrics were touted a type of personal data 
which was wholly owned by the individual bearer with 
statutory implications depending on the governing 
jurisdiction [19]. It followed that a mandatory 
requirement by a government agency to collect and store 
fingerprint data may have been in breach of an 
individual’s legitimate right to privacy. In the U.S., court 
cases on this issue have found consistently that certain 
biometrics do not violate federal laws like the Fourth 
Amendment. It seems that the [20]: 
“…real test for constitutionality of biometrics… 
appears to be based on the degree of physical 
intrusiveness of the biometric procedure. Those 
that do not break the skin are probably not 
searches, while those that do are”.  
In the context of DNA we can almost certainly claim 
that there is “physical intrusiveness” of a different nature 
to the collection of surface-level fingerprints (figure 2). In 
the collection of blood samples we must “break” or 
“pierce” the skin, in the collection of saliva samples we 
enter the mouth and touch the inner lining of the mouth 
with buccal swabs, in the removal of a hair or clump of 
hair we are “pulling” the hair out of a shaft etc. And it is 
here, in these examples, where consent and policing 












Figure 2. Left: Finger “prints” on the surface of the skin. 
Right: DNA blood “sample” taken by pricking the skin 
 
6.1.2. Britain and DNA. In the world of DNA, there is a 
simple classification, followed by most law enforcement 
agencies that denote samples as either being of an 
“intimate” nature or “non-intimate” nature. In the British 
provisions of the original Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act of 1984 (PACE), section 65 defines intimate samples 
as: “a sample of blood, semen or any other tissue fluid, 
urine, saliva or pubic hair, or a swab taken from a 
person’s body orifice” and non-intimate samples as “hair 
other than pubic hair; a sample taken from a nail or from 
under a nail; a swab taken from any part of a person’s 
body other than a body orifice” [21, p.80]. Generally, it 
must be noted that at times police can take a sample by 
force but on other occasions they require consent. In 
Britain, prior to 2001, intimate samples from a person in 
custody were once only obtainable through the express 
authority of a police officer at the rank of superintendent 
and only with the written permission of the person who 
had been detained (section 62) [21]. Non-intimate 
samples could be taken from an individual without 
consent but with permission from a police officer of 
superintendent rank (section 63). In both instances, there 
had to be reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
person from whom the sample would be taken had been 
involved in a serious offence [21]. And above reasonable 
grounds, there had to be, theoretically at least, the 
potential to confirm or disprove the suspect’s involvement 
through obtaining a DNA sample [22, p.29]. Over time 
Acts such as the PACE have been watered down leading 
to controversial strategic choices in law enforcement 
practices, such as the trend towards growing national 
DNA databases at a rapid rate. 
 
6.2. Continuity of Evidence 
 
Policing and forensic investigative work, are no 
different to any other “system” of practice; they require to 
maintain sophisticated audit trails, even beyond those of 
corporate organizations, to ensure that a miscarriage of 
justice does not take place. However, fingerprints are 
much easier attributes to prove a continuity of evidence 
than DNA which is much more complex. A fingerprint 
found at a crime scene, does not undergo the same type of 
degradation as a DNA sample. Thus it is much easier to 
claim a fingerprint match in a court of law, than a DNA 
closeness match. Providing physical evidence in the form 
of a DNA sample or profile requires the litigator to prove 
that the sample was handled with the utmost of care 
throughout the whole chain of custody and followed a 
particular set of standard procedures for the collection, 
transportation, and handling of the material. The proof 
that these procedures were followed can be found in a 
series of paper trails which track the movements of 
samples [6, p.114].  
Beyond the actual location of the evidence, a 
continuity of evidence has to do with how a DNA sample 
is stored and handled, information related to temperature 
of the place where the sample was found and the 
temperature at the place of storage, whether surrounding 
samples to that being analyzed were contaminated, how 
samples are identified and qualified using techniques such 
as barcode labels or tags, how samples were tested and 
under what conditions, and how frequently samples were 
accessed and by whom and for what purposes [4, p.43]. 
When DNA forensic testing was in its infancy, 
knowledgeable lawyers would contest the DNA evidence 
in court by pointing to micro-level practices of particular 
laboratories that had been tasked with the analytical 
process. The first time that attention had been focused on 
the need to standardize procedures and to develop 
accreditation processes for laboratories and for personnel 
was in the 1989 case People v Castro 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 
(Sup. Ct. 1989). When DNA testing began it was a very 
unregulated field, with one commentator famously noting 
that: “clinical laboratories [were required to] meet higher 
standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than 
forensic labs [were required to] meet to put a defendant 
on death row” [9, p.55]. But it must be said, given the 
advancement in quality procedures, attacks on DNA 
evidence, rarely focus on the actual standards, and more 
so focus on whether or not standards were followed 
appropriately [9, p.61].  
In the event that a defense lawyer attempts to lodge an 
attack on the DNA evidence being presented in a court of 
law, they will almost always claim human error with 
respect to the procedures not being followed in 
accordance to industry standards. Human error cannot be 
eradicated from any system, and no matter how small a 
chance, there is always the possibility that a sample has 
been wrongly labeled or contaminated with other external 
agents [9]. Worse still is the potential for a forensic expert 
to provide erroneous or misleading results, whether by a 
lack of experience, a miscalculation on statistical 
probabilities or deliberate perjury. The latter is complex 
to prove in court. Some have explained away these human 
errors toward wrongful conviction as a result of undue 
political pressure placed on lab directors and subsequently 
analysts for a timely response to a violent crime [16, 
p.157]. As Michaelis et al. note [9, p.69]: 
“[i]n far too many cases, the directors of 
government agencies such as forensic testing 
laboratories are subjected to pressure from 
politicians and government officials to produce 
results that are politically expedient, sometimes at 
the expense of quality assurance… Laboratory 
directors are too often pressured to produce results 
quickly, or to produce results that will lead to a 
conviction, rather than allowed to take the time 
required to ensure quality results.” 
Thus attacks on DNA evidence can be made by attacking 
the chain of custody among other strategies shown in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Ways to Mitigate the Effect of DNA Evidence 
- New type of DNA test 
- Expert not qualified to testify as to DNA results 
- Laboratory not accredited 
- Testing not performed by certified technicians 
- Lack of discovery material or notice with respect to the 
  admission of DNA evidence 
- Improperly obtained DNA evidence 
- DNA profile should have been purged from database 
- Expert not qualified to testify as to statistics 
- Statistics do not conform to standards accepted by the  
  scientific community 
- Irrelevant/improper database use 
- Expert not qualified to testify as to statistics in context 
  opinion is being offered 
- Attacking laboratory techniques and conditions 
- Attacking DNA test used 
- Attacking chain of custody 
- Attacking expert witness 
- Contamination 
- Attacking the choice not to employ several different  
  DNA tests, including sequencing 
- Preventing testimony regarding the ultimate issue 
          o DNA evidence is useful for exclusion, it cannot 
              identify with certainty 
          o Objecting to testimony regarding  
              defendant’s guilt 
 
7. The Difference between Databases and 
Databanks 
 
7.1. Of Profiles and Samples 
 
In almost any biometric system, there are four steps 
that are required towards matching one biometric with 
another. First, data is acquired from the subject, usually in 
the form of an image (e.g. fingerprint or iris). Second, the 
transmission channel which acts as the link between the 
primary components will transfer the data to the signal 
processor. Third, the processor takes the raw biometric 
image and begins the process of coding the biometric by 
segmentation which results in a feature extraction and a 
quality score. The matching algorithm attempts to find a 
record that is identical resulting in a match score. Finally, 
a decision is made based on the resultant scores, and an 
acceptance or rejection is determined [23]. At the 
computer level, a biometric image is translated into a 
string of bits, that is, a series of one’s and zero’s. Thus a 
fingerprint is coded into a numeric value, and these values 
are compared in the matching algorithm against other 
existing values. So simply put, the input value is the 
actual fingerprint image, and the output value is a coded 
value. This coded value is unique in that it can determine 
an individual profile. 
With respect to the extraction of a DNA sample the 
process is much more complex, as is its evaluation and 
interpretation. A DNA sample differs from a fingerprint 
image. A sample is a piece of the body or something 
coming forth or out from the body, while in the case of 
fingerprints, an image is an outward bodily aspect. When 
a DNA sample undergoes processing, it is also coded into 
a unique value of As, Ts, Gs and Cs. This value is 
referred to as a DNA profile. Storing DNA profiles in a 
computer software program is considered a different 
practice to storing the actual feature rich DNA sample in a 
DNA store. Some members of the community have 
volunteered DNA samples using commercial DNA test 
kits such as “DNA Exam” by the BioSynthesis 
Corporation [24]. For example, the DNA Diagnostics 
Center [25] states that one may: 
“…elect to take advantage of [the] DNA banking 
service without any additional charge if [one] 
orders a DNA profile [and that the company] will 
store a sample of the tested individual’s DNA in a 
safe, secure facility for 15 years—in case the DNA 
sample is ever needed for additional testing”.   
The controversy over storing “samples” by force in 
the crime arena has to do with the potential for DNA to 
generate information such as a person’s predisposition to 
disease or other characteristics that a person might 
consider confidential. It is the application of new 
algorithms or extraction/ evaluation/ interpretation 
techniques to an existing sample that is of greatest 
concern to civil liberties advocates. Profiles are usually 
unique combinations of 16 markers [26], they can only be 
used to match, and cannot be used toward further fact 
finding discoveries although some believe that you might 
be able to draw conclusions from profiles in the future. In 
a given population, there are several different alleles for 
any single marker and some of these may appear more 
frequently than others. The best markers are those with 
the greatest number of different alleles and an even 
distribution of allele frequencies [9, p.19].  
 
7.2. Of Databases and Databanks 
 
Although textbooks would have us believe that there 
is a clear-cut distinction about what constitutes a database 
as opposed to a databank, in actual fact the terms are used 
interchangeably in most generalist computing literature. 
Most dictionaries for example will define the term 
database without an entry for databank. A database is a 
file of information assembled in an orderly manner by a 
program designed to record and manipulate data and that 
can be queried using specific criteria. Commercial 
enterprise grade database products include Oracle and 
Microsoft Access. The International Standards 
Organization however, does define a databank as being “a 
set of data related to a given subject and organized in such 
a way that it can be consulted by users” [27]. This 
distinction is still quite subtle but we can extrapolate from 
these definitions that databases are generic information 
stores, while databanks are specific to a subject [28].  
In the study of DNA with respect to criminal law, the 
distinction between databases and databanks is a lot more 
crystallized, although readers are still bound to be 
confused by some contradictory statements made by some 
authors. Still, in most cases, a databank is used to 
investigate crimes and to identify suspects, and a database 
is used to estimate the rarity of a particular DNA profile 
in the larger population [9, p.99]. Databanks contain 
richer personal information related to samples, even if the 
identity of the person is unknown. For example, the 
databank can contain unique profiles of suspects and 
convicted criminals and content about physical crime 
stains and records of DNA profiles generated by specific 
probes at specific loci [10, p.40]. Databases are much 
more generic than databanks containing information that 
is representative of the whole populace or a segment of 
the populace. For example, a database can contain 
statistical information relating to the population 
frequencies of various DNA markers generated from 
random samples for particular ethnic groups or for the 
whole population at large. Databanks may contain rich 
personal data about offenders and cases [16, pp.157f] but 
databases only contain minimal information such as the 
DNA profile, ethnic background and gender of the 
corresponding individuals. 
The premise of the DNA databank is that DNA profile 
data of known offenders can be searched in an attempt to 
solve crimes, known as ‘cold cases’. They are valuable in 
that they can help investigators string a series of crimes 
together that would otherwise go unrelated, allowing for 
the investigator to go across space and time after all other 
avenues have been exhausted [9, p.99]. With respect to 
violent crimes, we know that offenders are highly prone 
to re-offending and we also know that violent crimes 
often provide rich DNA sample sources such as bones, 
blood, or semen. Thus DNA left at the scene of a crime 
can be used to search against a DNA databank in the hope 
of a “close” match [16, p.157]. The probative value of the 
DNA evidence is greater the rarer the DNA profile in the 
larger population set [9, p.19].  
 
Table 3. The NDNAD Database Attributes [30] 
- Unique barcode reference number linking it to the stored 
  DNA sample 
- Arrest Summons Number, which links it to the record on  
  the Police National Computer (PNC) containing criminal  
  records and police intelligence information; 
- the person’s name, date of birth, gender and “ethnic  
  appearance” (as assigned by a police officer); 
- information about the police force that collected the  
  sample; 
- information about the laboratory that analyzed the  
  sample; 
- sample type (blood, semen, saliva, etc); 
- test type; 
- DNA profile as a digital code. 
 
Different jurisdictions have different standards on the 
criteria for inclusion into DNA databanks and what 
attribute information is stored in individual records and 
who has access. In the United States for instance, 
different states have different rules, some allowing for 
DNA databanks to be accessed by law enforcement 
agencies alone, and others allowing for public officials to 
have access for purposes outside law enforcement [9, 
p.100]. In the U.S. the CODIS (Combined DNA Index 
System) system was launched in 1998-99 by the FBI. It 
contains two searchable databases, one with previous 
offenders and another with DNA profiles gathered from 
evidence at crime scenes [9, p.16]. In the case of the U.K., 
the National DNA Database (NDNAD) of Britain, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, contains very detailed information 
for each criminal justice (CJ) record (see table 3) and 
profiles are searched against each other on a daily basis 
with close hit results forwarded on to the appropriate 
police personnel. It is quite ironic that the 1995 NDNAD 
is a databank but is so large that it is considered a 
database by most, as is also evident by the fact that the 
word “database” also appears in the NDNAD acronym 
[29, p.2]. 
 
8. Legal, Ethical and Social Concerns 
 
The collection, storage, and use of DNA samples, 
profiles and fingerprints raise a number of legal, ethical 
and social concerns. While some of the concerns for the 
collection and storage of an individual’s fingerprints by 
the State have dissipated over the last decade, the debate 
over the storage of DNA samples and profiles rages more 
than ever before. It was around the turn of the century 
when a number of social, ethical and legal issues were 
raised with respect to DNA sampling but councils and 
institutes through lack of knowledge or expertise could 
hardly offer anything in terms of a possible solution or 
way forward to the DNA controversy [31, p.34]. At the 
heart of the techno-legal “controversy” is a clash of ideals 
coming from a collision of disciplines. For many medical 
practitioners working on topics related to consent or 
confidentiality, the legal position on DNA is one which 
acts as a barrier to important medical research. While few 
would dispute the importance of data protection laws and 
the ethical reasons behind balancing the right to privacy 
against other rights and interests, some in the medical 
field believe that the law has not been able to deal with 
exceptions where the use of DNA data could be 
considered proportionate, for instance, in the area of 
epidemiology. There are those like Iverson who argue that 
consent requirements could be relaxed for the sake of the 
common good.  
“We are not arguing that epidemiological research 
should always proceed without consent. But it 
should be allowed to do so when the privacy 
interference is proportionate. Regulators and 
researchers need to improve their ability to 
recognize these situations. Our data indicate a 
propensity to over-predict participants’ distress 
and under-predict the problems of using proxies in 
place of researchers. Rectifying these points would 
be a big step in the right direction” [32, p.169].  
Thinking in this utilitarian way, the use of DNA 
evidence for criminal cases, especially violent crimes, is 
something that most people would agree is a legitimate 
use of technology and within the confines of the law. The 
application of DNA to assist in civil cases, again, would 
seem appropriate where family and state-to-citizen 
disputes can only be settled by the provision of genetic 
evidence. Volunteering DNA samples to appropriate 
organizations and institutions is also something that an 
individual has the freedom to do, despite the fact that a 
large portion of the population would not participate in a 
systematic collection of such personal details. Voluntary 
donation of a DNA sample usually happens for one of 
three reasons: (i) to assist practitioners in the field of 
medical research; (ii) to assist in DNA cross-matching 
exercises with respect to criminal cases; and (iii) to aid an 
individual in the potential need they may have of 
requiring to use their own DNA in future uses with any 
number of potential possibilities. For as Carole 
McCartney reminds us:  
“[f]orensic DNA technology has multiple uses in 
the fight against crime, and ongoing research looks 
to expand its usefulness further in the future. 
While the typical application of DNA technology 
in criminal investigations is most often 
unproblematic, there needs to be continued 
vigilance over the direction and implications of 
research and future uses” [33, p.189].  
It is in this parallel development that we can see an 
evolution of sorts occurring with the collection of highly 
intimate personal information. On the one hand we have 
the law, on the other hand we have medical discovery, 
both on parallel trajectories that will have overflow 
impact effects on one other. For many, the appropriate use 
of DNA in the medical research field and criminal law 
field can only have positive benefits for the community at 
large. There is no denying this to be the case. However, 
the real risks cannot be overlooked. Supplementary 
industries can see the application of DNA in a plethora of 
programs, including the medical insurance of ‘at risk’ 
claimants to an unforeseen level of precision, measuring 
an individual’s predisposition to a particular behavioral 
characteristic for employment purposes [34, p.897], and 
the ability to tinker with the genes of unborn children to 
ensure the “right” type of citizens are born into the world. 
All of these might sound like the stuff of science fiction 
but they are all areas under current exploration. 
For now, we have the ability to identify issues that 
have quickly escalated in importance in the DNA debate. 
For this we have several high profile cases in Europe to 
thank but especially the latest case which was heard in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the 4 
December 2008, that being S and Marper v. the United 
Kingdom [35]. This landmark case, against all odds, acted 
to make the U.K. (and to some extent the rest of the world) 
stop and think about the course it had taken. For the U.K. 
this meant a re-evaluation of its path forward via a 
community consultation process regarding the decade old 
initiatives of the NDNAD. The main issues that the case 
brought to the fore, and those of its predecessor cases, can 
be found in summary in Table 4. The table should be read 
from left to right, one row at a time. The left column 
indicates what most authors studying the socio-ethical 
issues regard as an acceptable use of DNA, and the right 
column indicates what most authors regard as either 
debatable or unacceptable use of DNA. 
Of greatest concern to most civil libertarians is the 
issue of proportionality and the potential for a 
disproportionate number of profiles to be gathered 
relative to other state practices towards a blanket coverage 
databank. Blanket coverage databanks can be achieved by 
sampling a populace, a census approach is not required. 
Maintaining DNA profiles for some 15-20% of the total 
population, means you could conduct familial searching 
on the rest to make associations between persons with a 
high degree of accuracy [4, p.274], something that would 
be possible in the U.K. by 2018 if it maintained the same 
level of sampling due process. This is not without its 
dangers, as it promotes adventitious searching and close 
matches that might not categorically infer someone’s guilt 
or innocence.  
 
Table 4. Legal, Ethical and Social Issues Related to Use 
of DNA in Criminal Law 
Acceptable                      Debatable/Unacceptable 
Consent to DNA sample 
being taken 
DNA sample taken by 
force 
DNA sample taken only 
when charged 
DNA sample taken on 
arrest 
DNA profile retained only DNA sample and profile 
retained 
DNA sample retained for 
defined period 
DNA sample retained 
indefinitely 
DNA sample of adults 
retained only 
DNA sample of a minor 
retained 
DNA sample taken for 
violent crimes 
DNA sample taken for 
minor offences and violent 
crimes 
DNA data bank limited in 
scope 
DNA data bank too large 
for intended use 
DNA data bank 
anonymized 
DNA data includes 
personal details 
DNA profile for use by law 
enforcement 
DNA sample for use by 
other public officials 
DNA data bank is diverse DNA data bank targets 
ethnic minorities 
DNA profile used to cross-
match only 
DNA sample considered 
for future use 
DNA profile used to 
identify a suspect 
DNA profile used for 
familial searching 
DNA samples of innocents 
destroyed 
DNA samples of innocents 
retained 
Conviction based on 
multiple sources 
Conviction based on DNA 
evidence alone 
DNA following a chain of 
custody 
DNA interpretation of a 
degraded sample 
Authorized access to DNA 
data bank 
Unauthorized access to 
DNA data bank 
Accredited laboratory for 
DNA processing 
Off-shoring DNA data 
storage and processing 
Multiple authorities 
accountable for DNA 
One authority/agency 
accountable for DNA 
DNA analysis following 
quality practice 
Involvement of politicians 
in scientific process 
 
In addition, the large databanks are not without their 
bias. Already police records are filled with the presence of 
minority groups of particular ethnic origin for instance, 
which can have an impact on the probability of a close 
match despite someone’s innocence. Being on the 
database means that there is a chance a result might list 
you as a suspect based on having a similar DNA profile to 
someone else. And ultimately, the fact that innocent 
people would have their profiles stored on the NDNAD 
would do little in the way of preventing crime, and would 
lead before too long, to a de facto sampling of all state 
citizens. 
The driving force behind such a campaign could only 
be achieved by obtaining DNA samples from persons 
(including innocent people or ‘innocents’), either via 
some event triggering contact between an individual and 
the police or via an avenue at birth [10, p.40]. Police 
powers have increased since world wide terrorist attacks 
post 2000 especially, and this has led to a tradeoff with an 
individual’s right to privacy [36, p.14]. Notions of 
consenting to provide a DNA sample to law enforcement 
personnel have been challenged whereby the use of force 
has been applied. And not consenting to a sample being 
taken, even if you are innocent has its own implications 
and can be equally incriminating. So legislative changes 
have encroached on individual rights; whereby a warrant 
was once required to take a DNA sample from a suspect’s 
body based on reasonable grounds, today it is 
questionable if this caveat actually exists. 
Beyond the obvious downsides of retaining the DNA 
profile or sample of innocent people who are in actual fact 
law abiding citizens, there is the potential for persons to 
feel aggravated because they have not been let alone to go 
about their private business. Innocent persons who are 
treated like criminals may end up losing their trust in law 
enforcement agencies. This problem is not too small of a 
social issue, given that there are about 1 million innocent 
people on the NDNAD in the U.K. And in this context, it 
is not difficult to see how some individuals or groups of 
individuals might grow to possess an anti-police or anti-
government sentiment, feeling in some way that they have 
been wronged or singled out. In some of these ‘mistaken 
identity’ situations, surely it would have been better to 
prove someone’s innocence by using other available 
evidence such as closed circuit television (CCTV), 
without the need to take an intimate DNA sample first. 
Despite these problems, it seems anyone coming under 
police suspicion in the U.K. will have their DNA taken 
anyway [33, p.175].  
Of a most sensitive nature is the collection of DNA 
samples for an indefinite period of time [4, p.7]. In most 
countries, samples are taken and DNA profiles are 
determined and stored in computer databases, and 
subsequently samples are destroyed. The long-term 
storage of DNA samples for those who have committed 
petty crimes and not violent crimes raises the question of 
motivation for such storage by government authorities [4]. 
There are critics who believe that the retention of samples 
is “an unjustifiable infringement on an individual's 
privacy” [33, p.189].  
 
Table 5. Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Pertaining to 
DNA Databanks Identified by National Institute of Justice 
in the United States in 2000 [31, pp. 35f]. 
 
1. Group and trait identification: Thus, a particular 
profile in a crime scene sample may be more probably in 
one group than in another. There is already much public 
discussion of “racial profiling.” 
2. Identification of relatives: With 13 STR loci it is quite 
likely that a search of a database will identify a person 
who is a relative of the person contributing the evidence 
sample. Suppose a crime scene profile shows a partial 
match with someone in the database. Are law 
enforcement officers entitled to investigate the relatives? 
3. Broadening the database: The largest database at 
present is that of convicted felons, usually perpetrators of 
major crimes. There is considerable interest in increasing 
the database to include persons convicted of lesser crimes 
or arrestees. In Britain everyone arrested for offenses that 
would lead to prison terms if convicted has a DNA 
sample taken at the time of arrest, but the profile is 
removed from the database if the person is not convicted. 
Inevitably, there will be the increasing possibility of 
broadening the database to include the general public. 
There would be many advantages, such as identification 
of persons or body parts after accidents, or discovery of 
kidnapped or lost people. At the same time, the risk to 
individual privacy would be enhanced and protection of 
anonymity would be harder. Balancing benefits and risks 
of population databases will continue to be a contentious 
issue in the future. 
4. Saving DNA samples: At present, there is no clear 
overall policy as to what happens to the DNA sample 
after profiles are added to the database, but the majority 
of States now have sample storage policies. It can be 
argued that saving the DNA permits retesting and 
inclusion of additional loci, particularly newly discovered 
ones. This would be much more efficient than searching 
out the person, who may not even be living. On the other 
side, it is argued that the profiles are recorded and that 
this information is all that is needed, not the DNA itself. 
Furthermore, those fearful of invasion of privacy are 
concerned lest the DNA become available to unauthorized 
parties or otherwise be used in ways that would disclose 
information that ought to remain confidential. 
5. Use of CODIS database for research: As the database 
enlarges and if it is broadened to include persons 
convicted of a larger variety of crimes, it might be 
possible that statistical studies of the databases cold reveal 
useful information. 
Caption: There is much that has changed with respect to 
social, ethical and legal issues since 2000, both in the 
United States and the United Kingdom since its 
publication. But the table still provides a historical insight 
into the growing list of issues that were identified at the 
turn of the century. 
Equally alarming is the storage of samples of 
innocents and also of those who are minors. Even more 
disturbing is the storage of samples with which no 
personal details have been associated. DNA databanks are 
not different to other databanks kept by the state- they can 
be lost, they can be accessed by unauthorized persons, 
and results can be misrepresented either accidentally or 
deliberately [33, p.188]. The stakes however are much 
higher in the case of DNA than in fingerprinting or other 
application areas because the information contained in a 
DNA sample or profile is much richer in potential use. All 
of this raises issues pertaining to how changes in the law 
affect society, and how ethics might be understood within 
a human rights context. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The legal, social and ethical issues surrounding the 
collection, use and storage of DNA profiles and samples 
is probably more evident today than at any other time in 
history. On the one hand we have the necessity to advance 
technology and to use it in situations in which it is 
advantageous to the whole community, on the other hand 
this same technology can impinge on the rights of 
individuals (if we let it), through sweeping changes to 
legislation. Whether we are discussing the need for DNA 
evidence in criminal law, civil law, epidemiological 
research or other general use, consent should be the core 
focus of any and every collection instance. Unlimited 
retention of DNA samples collected from those arrested 
but not charged is another issue where legislative reforms 
need to be taken in a number of European jurisdictions, 
although this trend seems to be gathering momentum now 
more so outside Europe. Another issue is the redefinition 
of what constitutes an intimate or non-intimate sample, 
and here, especially most clearly we have a problem in a 
plethora of jurisdictions with regards to the watering 
down of what DNA procedures are considered invasive as 
opposed to non-invasive with respect to the human body. 
The bottom line is that we can still convict criminals who 
have committed serious recordable offences, without 
needing to take the DNA sample of persons committing 
petty crimes, despite that statistics allege links between 
those persons committing serious and petty offences. So 
long as a profile is in a database, it can be searched, and 
the problem with this is that so-called ‘matches’ 
(adventitious in nature) can be as much ‘incorrect’ as they 
are ‘correct’. And this possibility alone has serious 
implications for human rights. The time to debate and 
discuss these matters is now, before the potential for 
widespread usage of DNA becomes commonplace for 




Although members of society should not expect to 
learn of a black market for DNA profiles just yet, it is 
merely a matter of time before the proliferation and use of 
such profiles means they become more attractive to 
members of illicit networks. There is now overwhelming 
evidence to show that identity theft worldwide is on the 
rise (although estimates vary depending on the study and 
state). The systematic manipulation of identification 
numbers, such as social security numbers, credit card 
numbers, and even driver’s license numbers for misuse is 
now well documented. Victims of identity theft know too 
well the pains of having to prove who they are to 
government agencies and financial institutions, and 
providing adequate evidence that they should not be held 
liable for information and monetary transactions they did 
not commit. Today’s type of identity theft has its 
limitations however- stealing a number is unlike stealing 
somebody’s godly signature. While credit card numbers 
can be replaced, one’s DNA or fingerprints cannot. This 
resonates with the well-known response of Sir Thomas 
More to Norfolk in A Man for All Seasons: “…you might 
as well advise a man to change the color of his eyes 
[another type of biometric]”, knowing all too well that 
this was impossible. While some have proclaimed the end 
of the DNA controversy, at least from a quality assurance 
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